Human Rights Brief
Volume 14

Issue 1

Article 1

2006

The "War on Terror" and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S.
Hearings of the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel
Mark W. Vorkink
American University Washington College of Law

Erin M. Scheick
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Vorkink, Mark W. and Erin M. Scheick. "The "War on Terror" and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S.
Hearings of the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel." Human Rights Brief 14, no. 1 (2006): 2-6.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Human Rights Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Vorkink and Scheick: The "War on Terror" and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S.

The “War on Terror” and the Erosion of the Rule of Law:
The U.S. Hearings of the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel
by Mark W. Vorkink & Erin M. Scheick*
it, have remained divisive issues. A former legal advisor to the Bush
Administration, Bradford Berenson, framed the current conflict as
“akin to the Goth’s sacking of Rome,” which threatened “the possible emergence of another 1,000 years of religious obscurantism
and the destruction of our liberal values.” Such hyperbolic descriptions are indicative of two central propositions underlying the Bush
Administration’s counterterrorism policy: (1) the uniqueness of the
terrorist threat and (2) the importance of interpretation in defining
the reach of human rights, humanitarian, and constitutional law.

T

Courtesy of the Washington College of Law

he lasting viability of human rights instruments
and their supporting legal framework is best tested during periods of conflict and political upheaval.
Terrorism,1 and the methods of its prevention, offers a
litmus test for the sustainability of these instruments and for the
rule of law as a whole. Government action to identify, apprehend,
and prosecute those responsible necessarily strains the exercise of
individual rights and freedoms. How this tension is resolved determines how and to what extent such rights may be realized.
In recognition of the conflict between individual rights and
counterterrorism measures, in August 2004 the International
Commission of Jurists2 brought together more than 160 international jurists who adopted the Berlin Declaration on Upholding
Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism. The
Declaration’s 11 principles mediate the relationship between counterterrorism measures and human rights, and identify a core set of
principles that states should adhere to in executing counterterrorism
policies. To further explore this intersection, the ICJ established the
Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and
Human Rights, whose eight members3 are tasked with exploring
the scope of modern terrorism and the effect of government counterterrorism efforts on human rights. Chaired by Justice Arthur
Chaskalson, the Panel will conduct hearings and invite submissions from NGOs, lawyers, academics, and experts in ten countries
and six geographic regions over the next 18 months. Ultimately,
the Panel will issue a final report documenting their findings.
On September 6th–8th, 2006, the Panel conducted its U.S.
hearings at American University Washington College of Law in
Washington, D.C. Activists, lawyers, members of civil society, and
government officials testified on the ramifications of the U.S.
“War on Terror” and the effects of recently enacted Administration
policies on human rights and the rule of law. This article documents the topics covered by these hearings and provides an
overview of the salient issues raised. These include: (1) the political
and legal framework of the “War on Terror”; (2) the impact of post9/11 programs on human rights and the rule of law; and (3) the
use of military versus criminal approaches to combating terrorism.
Above all, the testimony given before the Panel evidenced an emerging consensus that the Bush Administration’s “War on Terror” has
resulted not only in an assault on individual human rights but,
more broadly, in an erosion of the rule of law that threatens the
continued strength of domestic and international legal systems.

The Eminent Panel of Jurists, from left: Robert K. Goldman; Hina Jilani;
Arthur Chaskalson; Mary Robinson; Georges Abi-Saab; and Vitit Muntarbhorn.

Conceptualizing modern terrorism as historically unprecedented is a common rhetorical-framing technique used to justify
controversial counterterrorism measures. The Panel heard from a
number of persons who stressed that the “War on Terror” was
different from other conflicts. Efforts to combat this “new” threat
must then, so the argument goes, be equally novel, and should neither be judged nor constrained by adhering to existing legal norms.
This conceptualization is particularly evident in the use of a war or
military paradigm as opposed to a law enforcement approach.
That the current conflict is different, unconventional, or
asymmetrical in no way validates Administration calls for a carte
blancé in mounting a U.S. response. Comparing the present conflict to the U.K.’s experience in Northern Ireland, ICJ President
Arthur Chaskalson noted that:
There was almost complete acceptance by everyone we spoke
to … [in the U.K.] that they had really made a mistake in
Northern Ireland. Their policies … didn’t stop terrorism, they
provoked it: people who might not have become involved [with
the IRA] became involved …. The Irish experience had been
that the harsh measures that were taken were counterproductive, and that progress was made only when they [the U.K.]
changed their policies.4

The Framework of the Bush Administration’s
Counterterrorism Measures
There is little doubt that the events of September 11th fundamentally altered U.S. approaches to security, intelligence, and
counterterrorism. Yet while the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon confirmed the material nature of a terrorist
threat, the scope of this threat, and the force necessary to counter

Emphasis on the uniqueness of the terrorist threat nonetheless
remains a fundamental rhetorical device of the Bush Administration
in arguments supporting its counterterrorism policies. There is as
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yet little or no recognition by the administration that documented
abuses and legal violations committed pursuant to these policies
frustrate effective counterterrorism efforts.5 Testimony before the
Panel, focusing in large part on the “shades of gray” inherent in
U.S. counterterrorism efforts, belies the Bush Administration’s
approach to the rule of law, which is predicated on an insistence on
interpretation and the recognition of the limits of traditional legal
standards. “We do not engage in torture” is a persistent refrain.
Little analysis is made, however, on the subjective definition of
“torture” and how, if construed so narrowly, any and all interrogation methods would be permissible.
Parsing the definition of torture is but one example of how
careful use of interpretation functions to circumvent clearly established legal principles. Officials sympathetic to the Administration’s
position cautioned the Panel that its investigation of alleged abuses
ignored the more fundamental issue of the underlying legal framework supporting Administration policies. “The debate exists one

opinion, torture does not reveal quick, reliable information.
Information obtained by torture is used to imprison the guilty and
innocent alike. Torture corrupts the perpetrator, and its application is never narrowly tailored. Stress, duress, and psychological
pressure are all forms of torture, prohibited by Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions. Finally, torture is incongruous with
international standards of morality.
In the five years since 9/11, there have been numerous allegations and extensive evidence of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment in detention and prison facilities run by the
United States. Beginning in 2003, allegations of abuse of prisoners
held in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq surfaced, and by early 2004,
the media released lurid, disturbing photos depicting U.S. military
personnel abusing prisoners. “Practices of forced nudity, taunting,
waterboarding, and other practices have been held by the court to
be violations of U.S. law,” declared Eric L. Lewis, member of the
board of directors of the human rights advocacy group Global

“You can’t just look at this as a few people who are affected;
it’s actually a whole legal structure. You must look at
the cumulative effect of what has happened.”
step prior to that,” Berenson argued, “that is, whether the
Administration is acting in violation of [its subjective interpretation
of ] the law.” Given the response of the majority of the witnesses,
and the questions raised by the Jurists themselves, this position is
far from tenable. The extreme nature of the violations documented
refutes any suggestion that such abuses fall short of torture, regardless of the administration’s definition. Testimony before the Panel
revealed that, to the contrary, these abuses represent an affirmative
administrative policy to circumvent and disregard fundamental
principles of U.S. and international law.

Rights. Even so, “these practices have been shown to be a direct
result of decisions and orders given by the administration and
specifically, the Secretary of Defense.”
Though reports of secret CIA prisons surfaced nearly a year
ago,8 it was not until early September 2006 that President George
W. Bush confirmed the existence of the secret facilities. The president denied allegations of torture, but admitted the use of “tough”
interrogation tactics aimed at obtaining information for national
security or prosecution purposes.9 Fourteen high-profile detainees
were recently transferred from the secret prisons to the U.S. army
base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. However, allegations of prisoner
maltreatment and abuse at the base are rampant, and three
detainees committed suicide in June 2006. Furthermore, detainees
at Guantánamo are frequently declared “enemy combatants” and
face arbitrary and indefinite detention.
Finally, the U.S. has been complicit in suspected torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment through the reliance on
extraordinary rendition. The Convention Against Torture, to
which the U.S. is a party, expressly forbids the extradition of any
person to a country where there are “substantial grounds” for
believing that there is a danger of torture. Known as the principle
of “non-refoulement,” States Parties should consider both historic
and current patterns of gross, flagrant, or mass human rights
violations as one factor when evaluating the risk of torture in a
receiving country.10
International obligations, however, have not kept the U.S.
from extraditing terrorist suspects to countries where there are
“substantial grounds” for believing that there is a danger of torture
or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Without any semblance of a judicial process, the U.S. has relied upon “extraordinary
renditions” to send terrorist suspects to Syria, Egypt, and other
countries in the Middle East and Asia where human rights abuses

The Impact of Post–9/11 Administration
Counterterrorism Policies
Much of the discussion presented during the three days of
hearings focused on the immediate and potentially lasting effect
of Bush Administration counterterrorism measures. Speaking on
behalf of victims of torture, prisoners in indefinite detention, and
citizens with constitutional claims, witnesses described how post9/11 programs have inflicted direct and cognizable harm to individuals and the administration of justice. Testimony revolved around
documented abuses, the weakening of judicial processes, and the
global impact of U.S. policies, all of which are mutually reinforcing.
“You can’t just look at this as a few people who are affected,” Justice
Chaskalson urged, “it’s actually a whole legal structure …. You
must look at the cumulative effect of what has happened.”6 As will
be shown, the continual erosion of judicial safeguards within the
United States could precipitate an international decline in the
strength of human rights and humanitarian law.

Documented Abuses
Research from the Center for Victims of Torture debunks many
common myths about torture.7 Contrary to the Administration’s
3
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dangerous because it could start unraveling and that would be
a very serious thing.16

documented.11

are well
The Bush Administration defends these
renditions by claiming that, in all instances, diplomatic “assurances” are secured from the receiving country. However, these
“assurances” bear no legal weight and thus present no legitimate
protection to the extradited person. As it is difficult to document
torture, which is generally practiced in secret, it is likewise difficult
to challenge the breach of a diplomatic assurance. In practice,
extraordinary renditions allow the U.S. to turn a blind eye to maltreatment and abuse of detainees in the name of national security.

In light of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which
redefines Common Article 3 and grants the president the power
to issue Executive Orders further interpreting the meaning of the
article, Justice Chaskalson’s warning of the “unraveling” of the
international human rights system rings true. The president’s reinterpretation of a 50-year old instrument of international law
threatens the foundation of worldwide consensus on the laws of
war. Furthermore, the Administration’s disregard for the protections enshrined by Common Article 3 — what can be viewed as
the heart of the Geneva Conventions — will jeopardize prohibitions of torture worldwide. Jumana Musa, of Amnesty
International, highlighted this fact:

Weakening of Judicial Processes
Between August 2004 and March 2005, 558 detainees held at
Guantánamo Bay were assessed before an ex parte Combatant
Status Review Tribunal, which found 520 to be “enemy combatants.”
According to the U.S., these “enemy combatants” could be held
indefinitely (or until the end of the “war on terrorism”), without
the right to speak with a lawyer or challenge their detention before
a judicial body.12 As of June 2006, only 14 “enemy combatants”
had been charged with a crime triable before a newly established
military commission. The nearly 500 detainees remaining
at Guantánamo have not been charged with any crime and thus
cannot expect to be brought before any court of justice.13
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,14 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the military commissions established by the Bush Administration
to try Guantánamo detainees violated both the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. The proposed
military commission would permit the use of hearsay, unsworn testimony, and evidence obtained through torture, and could forbid
the defendant and the defendant’s attorney from viewing the evidence to be used against the defendant at trial. The government
maintained that the Geneva Conventions did not apply as the
detainees were not prisoners of war. But the Supreme Court
disagred, maintaining that at the very least, Common Article 3
(the prevention of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment) was applicable to the detainees held at Guantánamo.
Prior to adjourning for the mid-term election season, both
houses of the U.S. Congress passed the controversial Military
Commissions Act of 2006. The Act establishes Military
Commissions, redefines U.S. obligations under Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, strips detainees of their right to file
habeas corpus pleadings, allows for evidence obtained by coercion
or hearsay, and limits a defendant’s right to examine government
evidence.15 In effect, the Military Commissions Act codifies the
incremental erosion of defendant judicial rights that has occurred
since September 11, 2001.

What is more worrisome is that there are several countries that
have done similar things in setting up military commissions. In
the past we have influenced these countries, and now the U.S.
is losing its ability to influence other countries. Hosni
Mubarak, president of Egypt, declared that this movement of
the U.S. to military commissions validates the historic use of
military commissions elsewhere.

The Administration’s clampdown on other civil liberties and
fundamental freedoms reinforces Musa’s sentiment. Though the
U.S. is a beacon of “freedom of the press,” the increasing secrecy
within the Administration and the fear of espionage is threatening
the freedom of journalists throughout the country. Warrantless
wiretapping programs and the targeting of Arab and MuslimAmericans for suspected terrorist activity likewise threaten civil
liberties within the U.S., and the implications of these policies are
far-reaching. The ironic impact the fight against terrorism is having
on U.S. domestic policy is profound, even as the U.S. continues to
advocate for expanding democracy and freedom around the world.

The Implications of the “War on Terror”
Political discourse reveals the Bush Administration’s success
in framing the present conflict as a “war on terror” — whether or
not such a description is legally appropriate. In many respects, the
government’s invocation of a military paradigm is a leading cause
of the abuses documented above; the language of war serving,
above all, as a justification for the use of so-called “emergency” procedures. But as one witness noted, “The problem is that it is part
metaphor and part reality. The constant use of the word ‘war’ is a
debater’s trick to persuade the audience that anything goes, and
that executive power is supreme over either legislative or judicial
[power].” Testimony before the Panel showed that one of the greatest obstacles to the maintenance of human rights today is this
struggle against the pervasiveness of this military paradigm.
The administration contends that use of a war framework is
warranted in light of the potential magnitude of harm and the
undeterable nature of the belligerents. In support of this argument,
administration officials cite to Osama bin Ladin’s declaration of
war and to NATO’s invocation of Article 5 immediately following
the 9/11 attacks. With specific regards to the latter, it has often
been stated that “If there was one lesson of 9/11, it was that this
was not simply a criminal act, and that the war being waged
against us was really a war, not metaphorically or abstractly.” Yet
this position is untenable. That the orchestration of the 9/11 plot
was as unorthodox as it was abominable does not warrant the invention of an equally aberrant response. “There is a tendency to say

Global Impact
The global impact of the U.S.-led “War on Terror” and the
subsequent procedures employed by the Administration to capture
and detain suspected terrorists must not be understated. When
asked whether U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism could
erode the international human rights framework, Justice
Chaskalson responded:
I think this does pose a threat to it. So far, at the international
level, there has been an insistence on compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law standards, but I do
think we are seeing as we move around the world, we are seeing
practices that are quite questionable in relation to those standards. And it does have an impact because this network is interdependent, and you start tinkering with it, it is potentially
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that because terrorism is different, the [existing] structure doesn’t
apply,” Justice Chaskalson noted. Testimony given on behalf of the
administration clearly showed that it is this presumed uniqueness
of the threat that operates as the primary rhetorical ammunition
for the government’s “War on Terror.” When pressed by the Panel,
however, this justification failed.
In her testimony before the Panel, Gabor Rona, International
Legal Director at Human Rights First, reiterated that International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) conceives of only two “states” of armed
conflict: (1) international armed conflict — conflicts between sovereign states; and (2) non-international armed conflict — insurrections, civil wars, or guerilla operations that are fundamentally
domestic in both their scope and objective. Temporarily setting
aside the more problematic issue of defining the United States’
“enemy,” the paradox presented by the “War on Terror” is that
while waged globally, the belligerent identified by the U.S. is

Witnesses expressed grave concern regarding the implications
of designating individuals as “enemy combatants.” Pursuant to
the law supporting the “War on Terror,” an enemy combatant is
legally an unprivileged belligerent, and retains none of the rights
traditionally afforded military personnel in international armed
conflicts — including mandated detention schemes, POW status,
and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Lacking these protections, the administration’s
“notion of a global war … suggests that if I can identify an Al-Qaeda
member [or one affiliated with an organization linked to Al-Qaeda],
I should be able to directly attack that person and that would not
constitute a violation of either the law of war or human rights law.”
In more precise terms, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch
Kenneth Roth noted that once you are designated an enemy combatant, “the administration could simply shoot you and not even
resort to detention.” This conclusion is all the more shocking when
one considers the complete absence of procedural safeguards of the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals used to determine whether an
individual is an enemy combatant.
It is clear that the legal framework of the “War on Terror” has
resulted in numerous violations of human rights and humanitarian
law. What is less understood, and what many witnesses articulated,
is that the scope of this conflict and its undefined objective presents
a significant obstacle to any foreseeable solution. Witnesses for the
administration were asked repeatedly to define the terms of this
new conflict, and to identify both the nature of the “enemy” and a
timeline for the hostilities. No clear answers were given. Berenson
argued that contrary to the suggestions of the Panel, this war was
being waged against a readily identifiable enemy: Al-Qaeda.
But his inclusion of other groups who “use the same means” as
Al-Qaeda lends support to arguments made by opposing witnesses
that, in actuality, the “war on terror” lacks any real meaning because
“one cannot engage in a war against a method [or means] of war.”
Moreover, in addition to lacking a clearly defined “enemy,” a
deficiency that has allowed for the easy manipulation of military
objectives (the Iraq invasion a clear case in point), the Panel
expressed concern over the seemingly endless nature of the “War
on Terror.” The effect of this on human rights is most apparent
with respect to the detention of enemy combatants. Under U.S.
interpretation of the law of war, those designated as enemy combatants can be held until the cessation of hostilities. With no end
in sight, this designation is, in effect, a mandatory life sentence for
any detainee, executed pursuant to a determination hearing lacking even a bare minimum of procedural protections.
In the end, whether the U.S. is engaged in a “war” under
established principles of international law is less important to the
protection of human rights than whether the U.S. is strictly adhering
to fundamental procedural guarantees in whatever counterterrorism policy it adopts. As ICJ Jurist Hani Jilani stressed, even if the
U.S. succeeds in its argument that a state of war exists between it
and Al-Qaeda or another organization, war, like law enforcement,
must be conducted pursuant to clearly established rules. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 17 revealed
that, at least in terms of Common Article 3, the administration’s
capricious and deficient procedures were legally impermissible.
Ultimately, testimony on the applicability of a military framework
suggests that “the war on terror has been as much tactical as political. Even if you can classify it as a war, if we accept that, we should
accept the totality of the rule of law, rather than selectively using
the rules of war for political purposes.”

“The war on terror has been
as much tactical as political.
Even if you can classify it as
a war, if we accept that, we
should accept the totality of
the rule of law, rather than
selectively using the rules of
war for political purposes.”
unquestionably a non-state actor. This situation is prohibited by
IHL. Armed conflicts must either be international, with exclusive
state participation, or non-international, involving one of many
non-state actors. Clearly, the “War on Terror” falls outside established legal understandings of IHL.
That this “war” is incongruous with international law has not,
however, deterred the government from its military approach. One
of the primary reasons for its continued use is the administration’s
admitted refusal to employ a law enforcement (or criminal) model.
As Professor Baher Azmy of Seton Hall Law School argues, U.S.
adoption of a criminal law paradigm akin to that successfully
implemented by many European countries would proscribe,
among other things, secret prisons, indefinite detentions, and targeted killings of individuals affiliated with various organizations.
The ubiquitous use of these rights-abusive techniques makes clear
the administration’s reluctance to criminally prosecute suspects.
Not wanting to resort to criminal law, and recognizing the constraints of universally accepted laws of war, the administration has
devised a legal strategy to wage its “War on Terror” that is unprecedented in its arbitrary (and unsupported) interpretation of domestic
and international law. The most shocking examples of this new
legal framework include the enemy combatant designation, and
the undefined nature of the government’s military campaign.
5
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Conclusion

Witnesses noted that the U.S. has proceeded in this direction
before, most notably in the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts
of 1798. Yet the inherent checks and balances within U.S. law and
government functioned over time to redirect national policies
towards a rights-protective framework. More importantly, the
strong showing of the NGO community at the ICJ hearings illustrates the extent to which U.S. and international civil society are
mobilized. Private law firms, reluctant at first to defend detainees,
are now getting involved at increasing levels because of the overall
threat to the rule of law.
In the end, Justice Chaskalson noted that in the face of these
strong-arm policies:

At the close of their testimony, many witnesses stressed that
while individual violations were deplorable, their aggregate effect
on human rights and the rule of law was most detrimental. When
combined with the rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy, the “War on
Terror” has significantly reduced the global capacity of a human
rights discourse.
Speaking on behalf of the Carter Center, Senior Advisor for
Human Rights Karin Ryan argued that the rhetorical linkage
between terrorism and democracy has ill-served an already battered
human rights community. Terrorism is too often juxtaposed with
democracy, with the latter serving as a cure-all for the myriad
social, political, and economic factors that can precipitate terrorist
activities. U.S. advancement of democracy, then, as a fundamental
element of its foreign policy strategy in the “War on Terror” has led
in some cases to a backlash against democratic movements that are
viewed with suspicion as agents for U.S. hegemony. “This conflation of democracy and the fight against terrorism,” Ryan noted, “is
a problem for human rights activists who are cast in a pro-Western
light in their [advocacy] for democratic reforms.” Responding to
this comment, ICJ Jurist Hina Jilani asserted that democracy, or its
absence, is not the problem. Instead, disenchantment with the
conduct of so-called democratic governments poses the greatest
threat to the viability of democratic institutions. If the United
States and others want to speak in the language of democracy and
human rights, their policies must reflect these values, particularly
those linked to counterterrorism measures.
Beyond the criticisms and the deficiencies of current counterterrorism measures, there remain a number of persistent questions that have not yet been addressed by either the U.S. or the
human rights community. Foremost among these is the status of
detainees. Morton Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy for the
Open Society Institute, openly admitted that “what you can do
with people of whom you have evidence of terrorism is a difficult
question.” That some individuals at Guantánamo Bay might, if
given the opportunity, commit acts of violence against civilian targets is not disputed. The problem lies in the government’s inability (or unwillingness) to normalize their legal status. “Democratic
countries need to sit down and figure out what to do about
detainees because, undoubtedly, there are some people who can’t
be convicted but who might still be a threat.” Whether or not one
agrees with the administration’s framing of the “War on Terror,”
there is little argument that, in its wake, a legal vacuum was created. How long will this “war” last? Who can be prosecuted? Where
should detainees go after their release? These were questions raised
during the hearings to which there are no clear answers. Only over
time, and through careful and sustained negotiation among civil
society groups, national governments, and international organizations, can a resolution be achieved.
Upon completing their 18-months of international hearings,
the ICJ Eminent Jurists will issue a report in 2007, documenting
the intersection between terrorism, counterterrorism, and human
rights. While it is unlikely to contain explicit recommendations for
how countries should model their counterterrorism programs,
there is a good chance it will identify those procedures legally permissible under international law. Testimony before the Panel
revealed that counterterrorism measures often fall far short of these
legal benchmarks. Nonetheless, there is cause for some optimism.

There needs to be an awareness of the importance of these
rights — why we have these rights. They come out of long
struggles in the history of unfair procedures …. Over the years,
these protections have been brought to try to promote a more
open and democratic society. They lie at the core of democracy
because to achieve such a society, you must comply with the
rule of law, impose certain constraints on the exercise of government power, and ensure vigorous public debate. As soon as you
start encroaching upon these rights, you start to damage the
pillars upon which a democratic society is built.18
HRB

ENDNOTES: The “War on Terror”
1 There is no official legal definition of terrorism, and it is not the intention of

this paper to offer one. The ongoing dialogue over the meaning of this term is
nonetheless inseparable from the debate concerning methods for its prevention.
2 The International Commission of Jurists is an international non-governmental
organization founded in Berlin in 1952 and dedicated to the implementation
and promotion of international law and the advancement of human rights. The
Commission is composed of sixty eminent jurists who collectively represent the
range of international legal systems.
3 These include: Justice Arthur Chaskalson, President of the ICJ and Chair of
the Panel, and former President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa;
George Abi-Saab, a leading expert in public international law and former judge
at the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda; Robert K. Goldman, Professor of Law at American
University Washington College of Law and former UN Human Rights Commission expert on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights; Hina Jilani, Lawyer
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former UN expert on human rights
defenders; Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor of Law at Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok, and current UN expert on human rights in North Korea; Mary
Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the first
female President of Ireland; Stefan Trechsel, expert in criminal law and former
President and member of the European Commission on Human Rights; and
Judge E. Raúl Zaffaroni, current judge of the Supreme Court of Argentina and
an expert on Latin American and international criminal law.
4 Interview with Justice Arthur Chaskalson, President, ICJ Panel on Terrorism,
Counter-terrorism, and Human Rights, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 13, 2006).
5 This is most clearly illustrated in the recently declassified portions of the
National Intelligence Estimate. Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism, The New York Times, September
26, 2006 at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/world/middleeast/27itext.html. (accessed Oct. 3, 2006).
6 Chaskalson, supra note 4.
7 Center for Victims of Torture, Eight Lessons of Torture, http://www.cvt.org/main.php/Advocacy/TheCampaigntoStopTorture/WhatCVTknowsaboutTorture (accessed Oct. 10, 2006).
8 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, The Washington
Post, Nov. 2, 2005 at A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html.
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12 BBC News, Q & A: Guantánamo hearings, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3541126.stm (June 13, 2006).
13 Id.
14 548 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
15 Military Commissions Act of 2006.
16 Chaskalson, supra note 4.
17 548 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
18 Chaskalson, supra note 4.
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